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█ Abstract This essay has two goals. The goal of the first section is to raise a few clarificatory questions 
about the exact contour of Crane’s account of intentionality, its relation to phenomenology, and his moti-
vation for it. The second section aims to describe a general worry about programs that combine a broadly 
anti-externalist outlook on intentionality with the idea that there is an intimate connection between phe-
nomenology and intentionality. I argue that programs like this either suffer from a problem that I call in-
tentional luck or, in the attempt to avoid this problem, have to weaken the connection between intention-
ality and phenomenology. Since Crane’s general outlook falls under this program, it is subject to this worry. 
KEYWORDS: Intentionality; Phenomenal Intentionalism; Externalism; Phenomenal Experience; Veridical 
Experience 
 
█ Riassunto Riconsiderare l’intenzionalità fenomenica – Questo articolo persegue due obiettivi. Quello del-
la prima sezione è sollevare alcuni problemi di classificazione circa i confini specifici della descrizione di 
Crane dell’intenzionalità, il suo rapporto con la fenomenologia e le ragioni che la supportano. La seconda 
sezione mira a descrivere una obiezione generale ai programmi che combinano una prospettiva 
sull’intenzionalità di carattere ampiamente anti-esternalista con l’idea secondo cui ci sarebbe un legame 
stretto tra fenomenologia e intenzionalità. Intendo sostenere che programmi di questo genere offrono il 
fianco a un problema che chiamerò fortuna intenzionalista oppure, per evitare questo problema, devono 
indebolire il nesso tra intenzionalità e fenomenologia. Dal momento che la prospettiva generale di Crane 
ricade in questo programma, è soggetta a questa obiezione. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Intenzionalità; Intenzionalismo fenomenico; Esternismo; Esperienza fenomenica; Veridi-
cità dell’esperienza 
 

 AN OVERARCHING THESIS IN CRANE’S 
volume is that intentionality is the “defining 
characteristic” of the mental, the feature in 
virtue of which the mental is a unified subject 
matter. Three notable components of 
Crane’s account of intentionality, put in very 
general terms, are: (a) intentional states are 
not constituted by relations; in particular, 
they are not constituted by relations to prop-
ositions or concrete particulars, (b) there are 
multiple senses of intentional content and 
experiences have multiple contents corre-
sponding to these different senses of content, 
and (c) there is a constitutive relationship be-
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tween intentionality and phenomenal con-
sciousness. I shall refer to these theses as non-
relationalism, pluralism, and phenomenal in-
tentionalism respetively.1  
In the first section of this short essay I 
raise three questions about what I find rather 
puzzling about Crane’s construal of these 
theses and the dialectical relation between 
them. I do not think that my remarks in this 
section should be particularly troubling for 
Crane, because I suspect that they can be ad-
dressed by clarifying a few theses or modify-
ing them in minor ways that would not 
change their spirit.  
The second section turns to what I regard 
to be a more substantive issue. Here, I focus 
on phenomenal intentionalism. Crane is not 
alone in his advocacy of the idea that there is 
an intimate connection between phenomenal 
character and intentionality. The view has 
been popular in recent philosophy of mind.2 
In fact, Crane’s view would fit into an anti-
externalist brand of phenomenal intentional-
ism,3 by which I mean one that combines the 
phenomenal intentionality thesis with the 
thesis that experiences, even when they are 
veridical, are not constituted by relations to 
external concrete particulars.  
I used to be a strong advocate of the anti-
externalist brand of phenomenal intentional-
ism.4 But a worry about the view has been 
gradually growing in me, a worry for which I 
have not been able to find a satisfying solu-
tion. Since this general worry about the anti-
externalist brand of phenomenal intentional-
ism, I think it would apply to Crane’s view 
too. My goal in the second section is to elab-
orate on this worry.  
 
█  Crane’s three theses 
 
One puzzling aspect of Crane’s overall 
picture concerns Crane’s appeal to content 
pluralism to motivate the thesis that inten-
tional states, specifically experiences, are not 
relations to propositions. Content pluralism, 
which Crane credits Chalmers for, is the view 
that (a) there are many different senses of the 
term “content” responding to different theo-
retical demands, and (b) intentional states 
can typically have multiple contents corre-
sponding to these different senses of content.  
For example, experiences can have a layer 
of Fregean content that accounts for their 
phenomenology (or some aspect of their 
phenomenology) and a layer of Russellian 
content that accounts for our intuitions 
about their truth value or accuracy. Howev-
er, it is not clear to me why the idea that rela-
tions to propositions only models experienc-
es explains content pluralism. As Crane ar-
gues, if experiences are relations to proposi-
tions and there are multiple, and sometimes 
incompatible, propositions that experiences 
are relations to, then it seems at best peculiar 
that experiences have a uniform and coher-
ent phenomenal character.  
But a pluralist about content who wishes 
to be an intentionalist does not have to en-
dorse the additional thesis that all different 
senses of content are relevant to the nature 
experience. In fact, pluralism about content 
seems to provide some help for those who 
wish to identify experiences with relations to 
propositions. An analogy with a well-known 
case in meta-ethics might help us see why.  
When Mackie argued from moral plural-
ism to moral anti-realism, his reasoning was 
that different cultures have conflicting moral 
codes. Given this conflict we seem to face the 
problem of having to choose which set of 
moral codes is right and which is wrong. 
Mackie was unhappy with this forced choice. 
So he argued that rather than declaring one 
moral code correct and another incorrect, we 
should embrace moral anti-realism and de-
clare all moral codes as false. Mackie thus 
used the premise that there is widespread 
disagreement to motivate moral anti-realism. 
And for this reason, one of the reactions that 
his argument invited was to deny that there is 
such a widespread disagreement.  
Davidson, for example, famously argued 
that widespread disagreement is impossible 
because if different cultures widely disagree 
on the application of moral evaluative terms, 
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then they are not strictly speaking disagree-
ing because they are not using these terms in 
the same sense. Mackie and Davidson are 
both pluralists, albeit in different ways. 
Where Mackie is a pluralist about moral 
codes, Davidson is a pluralist about the 
meaning of evaluative terms that figure in 
moral codes. More importantly, Davidson’s 
pluralism is compatible with realism and in 
fact comes to save it from Mackie’s attack.  
As I understand it, Chalmers’ content plu-
ralism is closer in spirit to Davidson’s plural-
ism about the meaning of evaluative terms 
than Mackie’s pluralism about evaluative 
judgments. Chalmers’s pluralism thus dis-
solves the apparent disagreement about 
whether the content of experience is Fregean 
or Russellian. As the dissolution of the disa-
greement would take away the motivation 
for Mackie’s antirealism, the pluralist disso-
lution of the disagreement seems to take 
away the motivation for rejecting the view 
that experiences can be identified with rela-
tions to propositions. Crane thinks other-
wise, and it is not clear to me why.  
Crane’s commitment to the non-relatio-
nalist account of intentionality goes hand in 
hand with his rejection of the thesis that in-
tentional states, including beliefs and percep-
tual experiences, are fundamentally relations 
to propositions. But Crane combines this re-
jection with a second thesis. This is the thesis 
that it is “literally true” that beliefs and expe-
riences are relations to propositions.  
There is, again, an apparent tension here 
that Crane addresses by holding that rela-
tions to propositions only model intentional 
states and talk about relations to proposition, 
although literally true, is just theoretician’s 
talk. But it is puzzling to me how the labels of 
“modeling” and “theoreticians talk” remove 
the tension between non-relationalism and 
the idea that it is literally true that intention-
al states are relations to propositions.  
A central method for doing metaphysics 
has been to read our ontology from the mod-
els that we regard as true. Most Platonist 
about properties, for example, are realists 
about properties because they hold that the 
correct way to model the similarities between 
objects is to hold that they stand in instantia-
tion relations to the same property in the Pla-
tonic realm. Realist about numbers, for ex-
ample, often hold that the best way to ac-
count for the truth of true statements in 
number theory is to read their explicit quan-
tificational commitments at face value. Thus, 
if it is true that there is exactly one even 
prime number then it is true that numbers 
exist. It is for the same reason that some 
moral anti-realists are error theorists.  
This is not to say that it is not possible to 
reconcile the denial of the claim that a model 
captures the fundamental nature of truth 
makers for a domain of discourse with the 
idea that the model is literally true. One 
might hold that the apparent existential 
commitments of a model can be removed 
with correct analysis. Accordingly, we can ac-
count for the literal truth of statements such 
as “An average American owns .75 dogs” 
without committing ourselves to the exist-
ence of average Americans and the property 
of owning .75 dogs. We can do so because 
what we mean by this statement is that the 
total number of dogs owned by Americans 
divided by the total number of Americans is 
.75. But Crane does not seem to adopt a 
strategy like this. His non-relationalist ac-
count of intentionality is not an account of 
what people who think that intentional states 
are relations to propositions mean.  
A second way to remove the tension is to 
provide a non-standard semantics for the mod-
el that does not analyze its truth in terms of ref-
erence and satisfaction. Attempts to provide 
inferential role or conceptual role semantics fall 
within this category. But although Crane op-
poses semantic accounts of intentionality, his 
preferred substitute is a phenomenological ac-
count, not an inferential role semantics. I there-
fore find it strange that Crane does not simply 
deny the truth of the claim that intentional 
states are relations to propositions. 
The third puzzling aspect of Crane’s view 
has to do with the fact that he combines the 
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thesis that intentionality is not a relation with 
the view that all intentional states have inten-
tional objects. In fact, on his view, it is a defi-
nitional truth that intentionality consists in 
the directedness of the mind toward a subject 
matter, that is, the intentional object of the 
intentional state. However, talk about direct-
edness and having objects sounds relational. 
There is, therefore, an apparent tension here.  
If intentionality is essentially non-relatio-
nal, how could it be definitional that all inten-
tional states have an object? I think that there 
are several ways to understand the non-
relationality thesis that would remove this 
tension. However, these solutions do not seem 
to be available to Crane. Let me elaborate.  
The natural analysis of non-relationalism 
is that an intentional state consists in the in-
stantiation of a monadic property by a sub-
ject or one of its states. How does this square 
with the thesis that all intentional states have 
an object? One option is to hold that inten-
tionality consists in the instantiation of a 
specific class of monadic properties that can 
only be characterized with relational locu-
tions, for example, “thinks-about-x”, “sees-y”, 
etc. But this move leaves our basic question 
unanswered. One still wonders why inten-
tional properties could be only characterized 
by relational locutions.  
One possible answer is that it is in the na-
ture of intentional properties that their in-
stantiation brings about the existence of in-
tentional objects. We thus get intentional ob-
jects, as it were, for free. But this view has the 
implication that intentional objects are im-
manent to intentional states, and Crane ex-
plicitly rejects this view. A second answer is 
that there is something about the grammar of 
intentional discourse that imposes this con-
straint on monadic intentional properties. 
However, this solution also seems to be una-
vailable to Crane. For, in his polemic against 
Wittgensteinian views, he also explicitly re-
jects grammatical construals of intentionality.  
The solution that seems to be the closest 
to the letter of Crane’s view is to endorse a 
phenomenological conception of directed-
ness or aboutness. Accordingly, intentional 
states have an essential phenomenology of 
directedness or aboutness, and this grounds 
the fact that they can only be described in re-
lational terms. However, this seems to clash 
with another aspect of Crane’s overall out-
look. On Crane’s version of phenomenal in-
tentionalism, phenomenal consciousness is 
grounded in the entire intentional nature of 
mental states. So, Crane seems to ground 
phenomenology in intentionality. But the 
phenomenological solution seems to ground 
intentionality in phenomenology.  
As a last option, perhaps Crane’s rejection 
of relationalism should only be understood as 
a rejection of the view that intentionality 
consists in a relation to either propositions or 
concrete particulars. This would leave room 
for a modest form of relationalism according 
to which intentionality can be understood in 
terms of relations to non-propositional ab-
stracta. But I am not sure about this reading, 
because crane’s text often suggests that he 
rejects any brand of relationalism.  
I, therefore, do not see how Crane removes 
the tension between the non-relationality of 
intentionality and the relationality of inten-
tional talk, both of which he seems to endorse.  
 
█  Phenomenal intentionalism 
 
I ended the previous section with a ques-
tion about the correct way to understand 
Crane’s denial of relationalism about inten-
tionality. I also noted that Crane grounds the 
phenomenal character of experience in its in-
tentional nature, which makes his non-rela-
tionalism rather puzzling. No matter how 
Crane responds to these worries, I think it 
would be correct to say that his view would 
fit into an anti-externalist brand of phenom-
enal intentionalism, by which I mean one 
that combines the thesis that there is a con-
stitutive connection between intentionality 
and phenomenal character with the thesis 
that experiences are not constituted by rela-
tions to external concrete particulars.  
This thesis is compatible with the view 
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that experiences are a matter of the instantia-
tion of certain monadic properties by the 
subject (or the states of the subject), certain 
relations between the subject (or the states of 
the subject) and the domain of universals, or 
a combination thereof. As I noted earlier, I 
have grown somewhat worrisome about this 
view. The worry, put roughly, is that the anti-
externalist account of experience seems to be 
in tension with the idea that concrete exter-
nal particulars can be intentional objects of 
experience. In this section, I want to elabo-
rate on this worry.  
I find it undeniable that ordinary external 
particulars can be intentional objects of experi-
ences. This is partly because it seems very intui-
tive that we sometimes become aware of such 
particulars by experiencing them. When I saw 
the Eiffel tower for the first time, it was in vir-
tue of having the experience that I was able to 
become aware of the tower.5 So I find it natural 
to say that the tower was one of the intentional 
objects of my experiential awareness.  
Note that I do not say that the tower was 
the only intentional object of my experience. 
Perhaps my experiences also had some univer-
sals as intentional objects or perhaps my expe-
rience was also a form of self-awareness. And 
perhaps my awareness of the Eiffel tower was 
in some way dependent on the fact that these 
other objects were intentional objects of my 
experience. So maybe the fact that the tower 
was an intentional object of my experience 
was somehow mediated by these other items. 
But none of this would entail that the Eiffel 
tower was not one of the intentional objects 
of my experience.  
For these reasons, I think that, despite his 
explicit denial of the view that concrete par-
ticulars are intentional objects of experience, 
Crane would not disagree with my claim here. 
For, as I understand his view, Crane has a de-
manding notion of intentional objects in mind 
when he denies that concrete particulars can 
be the intentional objects of experiences.  
I am using the term in a much more per-
missive way that does not have the implica-
tion that my experience or its intentionality 
were constituted by a relation to the Eiffel 
power. Under this permissive sense, I find it 
undeniable that the Eiffel tower was an inten-
tional object of my experience. My worry is 
that this undeniable fact seems to be in ten-
sion with anti-externalism about experience.  
Here is a question that gives rise to the wor-
ry: given that on the anti-externalist picture ex-
periences are constituted by either the instanti-
ation of monadic properties or relations to uni-
versals, how could experiences ground a rela-
tion to an ordinary external particular?  
The standard internalist answer to this 
question is to appeal to an idea that echoes 
Frege’s maxim that sense determines refer-
ence. Accordingly, although experience is at 
best a relation to universals, it gives us a set of 
constraints that determines which particulars 
are the objects of experience. My experience 
of the Eiffel tower, for example, determines a 
unique set of conditions that are satisfied by 
the Eiffel tower and it is in virtue of satisfy-
ing these conditions that the Eiffel tower is 
the intentional object of my experience.  
But I do not find the Fregean solution sat-
isfying, at least not when it is combined with 
what I take to be the spirit of phenomenal 
intentionalism. To explain why, let me start 
with a thought experiment. Consider a possi-
ble subject who is going through a stream of 
conscious experience that is phenomenally 
identical with my experience as I am looking 
at the Eiffel tower. But, unlike me, this sub-
ject has no causal connection with the exter-
nal world in which it is located. For all we 
know, the subject might be a disembodied 
soul who is undergoing a random series of 
experiences that are phenomenally identical 
with my experience.  
Borrowing a term from Kriegel,6 I call this 
subject the space soul.7 Let us also add to our 
thought experiment that in the space soul’s 
world there actually is a qualitative duplicate of 
the Eiffel tower located exactly in the same dis-
tance and direction from the space soul’s point 
of view. Let us call this tower the D-tower.  
Now, on the Fregean take on phenomenal 
intentionalism experiences that have identi-
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cal phenomenal characters impose similar 
constraints on their intentional objects.8 My 
experience presents an object that has such 
and such characteristics, the space soul’s ex-
perience imposes similar constraints. In my 
case, there is an object, namely the Eiffel 
tower that satisfies such constraints. Fre-
geans, therefore seem to have a story to tell 
about how the Eiffel tower is one of the in-
tentional objects of my experience. What 
about the space soul’s case?  
I want to argue that Fregean phenomenal 
intentionalists face a dilemma in this case. 
Either they adopt a view of the constraints 
that has the implication that the D-tower sat-
isfies these constraints or they adopt a view 
of the constraints that implies that the D-
tower does not satisfy the constraints. How-
ever, both of these options are problematic, 
or so I shall argue.  
For the sake of argument, I assume that the 
alleged constraint that the experience of the 
space soul puts on its intentional object can be 
captured by an existential description. This 
would facilitate the discussion but the conclu-
sion that I want to draw does not hinge on it. 
We can assume that the constraint can be char-
acterized with the generic form “there is an x 
that has characteristics y1, …, yn”, were y1, …, yn 
range over monadic and relational properties. 
We can allow that these relations can be in-
dexed to or centered on the space soul.  
This would enable us to include reference 
to some particulars in the characterization of 
the relations namely, relations to the space 
soul itself, its experience, the possible world 
in which it exists, and the spatio-temporal 
location of its point of view. So a subset of y1, 
…, yn stands for the relations that x bears to 
these particulars. The crucial question is this: 
What are the properties and relations that we 
can allow in the description of the constraints? 
In particular, are we allowed to include a caus-
al relation between x and the space soul (or its 
experience) in the characterization of the con-
straints? The answer to this question deter-
mines which horn of the aforementioned di-
lemma we locate ourselves in.  
One option is to restrict the range of y1, …, 
yn to a small set of properties and relations 
that excludes causal relations between x and 
the space. This would leave it open for the 
constraints to be determinate enough to sin-
gle out the D-tower as their only satisfier. So 
on this view, as the single satisfier of the con-
straints, the D-tower would be the intention-
al object of the space soul’s experience. But 
this is, in my view, a problematic implication 
because it is just a matter of pure luck that 
the D-tower fits the alleged constraints that 
the space soul’s experience imposes on the 
world and it is hard to see how being the in-
tentional object of an experience can be just a 
matter of pure luck.  
In assuming that something cannot be the 
intentional object of an experience just as a 
matter of pure luck, I am assuming that the 
norms that govern intentional talk are, in an 
important respect, similar to the norms that 
govern knowledge talk. In the same way that 
one might hold an anti-luck account of 
knowledge that rejects attributions of know-
ledge of an object in cases of luck, one might 
also adopt an anti-luck view of intentionality 
that rejects regarding an object as an intention-
al object in cases of luck. In fact, one might ar-
gue that because there is an intimate connec-
tion between knowledge and intentionality an-
ti-luck views of knowledge can be used in an 
argument for anti-luck views of intentionality.  
Let us suppose that the D-Tower is one of 
the intentional objects of the space soul’s ex-
perience. Let us also suppose that experience 
can be a source of knowledge about its inten-
tional objects. It follows that the space soul 
knows that the D-Tower has such and such 
properties. But again, it is just a matter of pure 
luck that what the space soul comes to believe 
about the D-Tower as a result of its experi-
ences matches the properties that the D-tower 
has. The space soul just got lucky. It does not 
know anything about the D-Tower. So we get 
a reductio against the view that the D-tower 
is an intentional object for the space soul’s 
experience.  
It might be argued that the premise that 
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experience can be a source of knowledge 
about its intentional objects is problematic. 
But unless one subscribes to a radical form of 
skepticism or an externalist account of per-
ceptual knowledge, it is not clear that this ob-
servation would suffice to block the intuition 
that underwrites the argument. For we can 
modify the argument by replacing the target 
premise with a modified version according to 
which when some auxiliary requirements are 
satisfied, experience can be a source of 
knowledge about its intentional objects. 
Therefore, unless one could show that the 
auxiliary requirements for the attribution of 
knowledge cannot be satisfied in the case of 
the space soul, we get our reductio.  
Epistemologists disagree about what these 
auxiliary conditions are and, of course, there 
are externalist epistemologies under which 
one cannot say that the experience of the 
space soul is a source of knowledge. But 
views that are compatible with internalism 
do not seem to have this implication. For ex-
ample, views that are sometimes dubbed as 
liberal identify the auxiliary conditions with 
the absence of defeaters9, views that are 
sometimes dubbed as conservative identify 
them with a priori justification for the relia-
bility of experience10, and contextualist views 
identify them with the obtaining of specific 
types of contexts of knowledge attribution.11  
But on none of these views, the auxiliary 
conditions seem to be related to the space 
soul’s condition in a manner that implies that 
they cannot be satisfied in the space soul’s 
case. Of course an anti-externalist phenome-
nal intentionalist can adopt an externalist ac-
count of knowledge. But I find the rejection 
of the view that the D-tower is an intentional 
object for the space soul’s experience much 
more comforting than such a combination.  
I shall call the above problem, “the prob-
lem of intentional luck”. Obviously, my dis-
cussion of this problem has been quick and 
sketchy. But I am not worried about this 
sketchiness because my aim here is to sketch 
the contours of my worry. So let me turn to 
the other horn of the dilemma.  
The intuitive solution to the intentional 
luck problem is to add an appropriate causal 
requirement to the constraints that the space 
soul’s experience puts on the world around it. 
For example, one could add to the character-
istics of x that it is the cause of this experi-
ence, were “this experience” refers to the ex-
perience of the space soul. On this construal 
the D-tower would not be an intentional ob-
ject of the space soul’s experience because by 
assumption there is no causal relation be-
tween the D-tower and the space soul’s expe-
rience. So the problem of luck would not get 
off the ground.  
In general, adding the causal condition to 
the constraints would block the luck prob-
lem. For, if the intentional object of an expe-
rience is its cause, then it is not a matter of 
pure luck that the object satisfies the con-
straints that the experience imposes.  
I do not disagree with the insight that 
adding the causal constraint helps with the 
problem of luck. The problem is that it is not 
clear how such a solution would be available 
to the phenomenal intentionalist. For on this 
view, the constraints that experiences impos-
es on its intentional objects have to have an 
intimate connection to the phenomenology 
of experience12 and the most straightforward 
analysis of this connection is incompatible 
with adding the required causal clause to the 
constraints that space soul’s experience im-
poses on the world. 
The most straightforward analysis of the 
connection between the phenomenology of 
an experience and the constraints that it im-
poses on the world, in my view, is that all and 
only properties and relations that are phe-
nomenally manifest in an experience can en-
ter the characterization of the constraints 
that it imposes on its objects.  
When you experience a red apple in a “red-
dish” way, then redness is phenomenally mani-
fest to you; when you experience it as having an 
“apple-like” shape; then that kind of shape is 
manifest to you; if you experience it as being 
next to a banana, then the relation of being 
next to is phenomenally manifest to you.  
  Masrour 
 
106 
Phenomenal intentionalists could disagree 
about what it takes for a property to become 
phenomenally manifest. Nevertheless, the 
principle that what is phenomenally manifest 
to you is the determinant of the constraints 
that your experience puts on its targets is, in 
my view, a fundamental component of the set 
of intuitions that motivates phenomenal in-
tentionalism. One might even be tempted to 
argue that the thesis that phenomenally iden-
tical experiences impose similar constraints on 
the world is grounded on this principle. So I 
think that this principle is an integral compo-
nent of the spirit of the phenomenal inten-
tionalist approach to intentionality.  
But if we allow this constraint, then we can-
not add the causal clause to the characteriza-
tion of the constraints that the space soul’s ex-
perience (or my experience) impose on the 
world. In my case, although it might be true 
that the Eiffel tower is the cause of my experi-
ence, the Eiffel tower is not manifest to me as 
the cause of my experience. In other words, my 
experience does not manifest to me a causal re-
lation between the Eiffel tower and itself. So in 
an important sense, including the clause that 
the object is the cause of my experience to the 
characterization of the constraints would not 
be faithful to the phenomenal character of my 
experience. This is not to say that experience 
can never present causal relations.  
I actually think that experiences can, and 
often do, make causal relations among objects 
and events manifest to us. The point is simply 
that this is not the case in a normal visual ex-
perience in which we simply see an objet, say 
my visual experience of the Eiffel tower. Since 
the space soul has the same phenomenology as 
mine, then the same point applies to its expe-
rience. So I do not see how the phenomenal 
intentionalist might be able to add the causal 
clause to the constraints that the space soul’s 
experience puts on the world either.  
I therefore do not see how the anti-
externalist brand of phenomenal intentional-
ism could account for the fact that ordinary 
particulars can be intentional objects of some 
experiences. The natural option for the anti-
externalist would be to explain this fact in 
Fregean terms namely, in terms of constraint 
satisfaction. But I have argued that this 
choice would present the phenomenal inten-
tionalist with a dilemma.  
If she does not allow the experience-based 
constraints to include appropriate causal 
clauses, she runs into the problem of inten-
tional luck. But if she allows the experience-
based constraints to include the relevant 
causal relations then she would be violating 
the principle that experience-based con-
straints have to be faithful to the phenome-
nology of experience.  
I suspect that one way that Crane might re-
spond to the above challenge is to appeal to a 
pluralism about intentionality. Accordingly, he 
might hold that there are different senses of in-
tentionality and the type of intentionality that 
the phenomenal intentionalist aims to account 
for is not one under which ordinary particulars 
can be intentional object of experience.  
But I think this brand of phenomenal in-
tentionalism would concede too much valua-
ble ground. One of the potential attractions 
of the view that experiences are intentional is 
that the view can potentially make sense of 
the idea that it is in virtue of having experi-
ences that the mind can come to have the ex-
ternal world of particulars as the subject mat-
ter of its attitudes.  
But if phenomenal intentionality cannot 
deliver this result, it looses a great deal of 
what made it attractive.  
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